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President Obama has presided over two enormously significant foreign policy decisions in the past two weeks.

The first, for which the president deserves great credit, was the agreement between America and our allies on the one hand, and Iran on the other, which represents the first progress anyone has made in restraining Iran’s efforts to produce nuclear weapons. While it is not a complete resolution of this dangerous situation, it is a major advance – in contrast to the wholly unsuccessful results after eight years of effort by the Bush administration.

The other major decision that the president took also represents movement, but very much in the wrong direction – the badly mistaken decision to keep thousands of American troops in Afghanistan until 2024. The money that will be wasted in this effort is bad enough, but the gravity of the mistake is greatly compounded by the fact that one of its justifications is that it will allow us to continue to spend $4 billion per year until then on what has proven until now to be an impossible dream: transforming Afghanistan’s national security apparatus into an effective force.

I will write further about this decision next week because it is possible that President Hamid Karzai may behave so badly that he saves us from this mistake.

The situation regarding Iran’s nuclear capability will also be finally decided in the future, but we do know enough to be able to make a positive judgment about the initial agreement.

Iran has for the first time acknowledged the legitimate interest of other countries in restraining its move toward a weapons capability. It has agreed to take steps to slow down various aspects of its nuclear development, and committed itself to further restraint.

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True, this was not a complete success – it did not result in Iran giving in completely and taking irreversible steps to divest itself of a weapons capability. But this was a wholly unrealistic goal at this point in the process, and criticism along these lines comes from several parties that have themselves been unable to achieve anything.

I take some pride in the fact that tough economic sanctions initiated by the committee I chaired played a decisive role. But at no point when we were adopting them did we think that they would produce a complete reversal by Iran of its nuclear position all at once.

Of course, I wish Iran had never begun its nuclear quest. I wish even more profoundly that the Iranian regime were far less repressive. But wishing is no substitute for dealing with reality.

No one can seriously argue that the Iranian regime was ready to give everything we sought in the first stage of discussions. Insisting that the very first agreement be all or nothing – that the Iranian regime agree to all of our demands – legitimate as they are – ignores the reality not just of Iranian politics, but of international negotiations.

The major objection to these important steps comes from the unholy – or maybe too holy – alliance of convenience on this subject of Saudi Arabia and Israel. Both governments reasonably object not simply to the possibility that Iran will have nuclear weapons, but to the very nature of the Iranian government, and want to see the fall of the current regime.

Israel’s concerns in particular deserve respect, given the belligerently anti-Israel attitude of Iran’s leaders. But it’s a mistake to allow an entirely unrealistic, although highly desirable, objective to interfere with a genuine achievement on a lesser but still important goal.

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When I became chairman of the Financial Services Committee in 2007, I gave a high priority to the adoption of sanctions. The member of the committee staff who guided discussions was James Segel, a former chairman of the Jewish Community Council of Greater Boston, and, like me, a strong believer in the need to help preserve an Israel that is protected from hostile forces.

When the Obama administration took office, I was asked to meet with a high-level Israeli security official so that he could convey to me his government’s wish that Stuart Levey, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in charge of sanctions, be retained by the new administration. I agreed that he had done an excellent job in administering the sanctions we had helped adopt, and I was pleased when the Obama administration agreed as well and kept him on.

But we never thought that even the toughest sanctions would force an immediate, complete surrender by the Iranian government. What we hoped for at best was what Obama and our allies have achieved – the beginning of a serious negotiation in which Iran agrees that we have a right to demand restraint, and begins a process that should lead to that end.

And should the Iranians fail to comply with this agreement, or refuse to make further progress, we can easily fully impose all of the sanctions.

Obama has led a process that has produced better results in the effort to restrain Iran’s nuclear activity than almost anyone expected. No approach, short of the initiation of another Middle Eastern war, promises to achieve more.

We have three choices: Hope that the Iranian government will completely reverse its previous positions all at once, and alter its fundamental character in the process; participate in a military strike against Iran’s scattered nuclear facilities; or support the complex, politically sensitive set of negotiations in which the president is engaged, and which have so far been the only source of progress on this issue.

Barney Frank is a retired congressman and the author of landmark legislation. He divides his time between Maine and Massachusetts.

Twitter: @BarneyFrank

— Special to the Telegram

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